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10/10/67

REF: STATE 38288, 39665

1. WE ARE APPRECIATIVE DEPT'S COMMENT OUR REPORTING THIS SUBJECT AND AGREE NEW ASSESSMENT NOW RPT NOW APPROPRIATE. WE ARE CURRENTLY ENGAGED COMPREHENSIVE US POLICY AND PROGRAM REVIEW ALONG LINES OUR A-351, FEB 12, 1966, A-427, MARCH 26, 1966 AND A-475, MAY 7, 1966. THIS MESSAGE SUMMARIZES OUR VIEWS ON INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT. FINAL RESULTS OUR REVIEW WILL BE FORWARDED WHEN CONCLUDED.

PAGE TWO RUESGT QTPOXQCF S E C R E T NOFORN

2. THREAT FROM LEFT: (A) RURAL INSURGENCY. SUCCESSFUL COIN EFFORTS GOG SECURITY FORCES OVER PAST YEAR HAVE BROKEN UP ORGANIZED GUERRILLA PATROL-TYPE FIGHTING UNITS IN NORTHEAST. SELF-STYLED "RESERVE FRONTS" OF FAR IN VERAPACES AND SAN MARCOS DEPTS CURRENTLY INACTIVE AS REGARDS COMBAT BUT REMAIN POTENTIAL THREATS. FAR FRONT IN

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VERAPACES REPORTEDLY CONSISTS SMALL, WELL-TRAINED GROUP; SAN MARCOS FRONT BELIEVED PRIMARILY LOGISTICAL AND TRAINING CENTER WHOSE CHIEF ASSET IS PROXIMITY MEXICAN BORDER FOR REFUGE AND RESUPPLY. SMALL FAR UNITS REPORTEDLY ACTIVE SOUTH COAST AREAS, PRIMARILY ENGAGED FORMING CLANDESTINE CELLS AMONG CAMPESINOS. MR-13 (YON SOSA GOUP) REDUCED TO HANDFUL POORLY-ARMED AND SUPPLIED DIE-HARDS REPORTEDLY HIDING IZABAL DEPT. RECENT REPORTS INDICATE MR-13 MAY JOIN FORCES WITH FAR, BUT THIS WOULD BE RELATIVELY INSIGNIFICANT TO OVER-ALL THREAT PICTURE.

(B) URBAN TERRORISM. WHILE FAR'S "URBAN RESISTANCE FRONT" (URF), WHICH OPERATES ONLY IN GUATEMALA CITY, HAS ALSO SUFFERED HEAVY LOSSES AS RESULT COIN OPERATIONS GOG

PAGE THREE RUESGT 1509/ICF S E C R E T NOFORN
SECURITY FORCES, IT RETAINS CAPABILITY CARRY OUT SELECTED VIOLENCE, SABOTAGE, TERRORISM. PRECISE FIGURES ON URF MEMBERSHIP UNKNOWN, PROBABLY FLUCTUATE RAPIDLY AS RESULT REDEPLOYMENT TO AND FROM RURAL UNITS. BEST ESTIMATE IS ABOUT 200 URF EFFECTIVES. GUATEMALAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PGT) HAS LARGELY URBAN MEMBERSHIP OF ABOUT 250 ACTIVES, OF WHICH ONLY HANDFUL BELIEVED COLLABORATING WITH URF IN TERRORISM. PGT REPORTEDLY IS TRAINING ADDITIONAL G OUP APPROXIMATELY 70 MEN FOR SEPARATE, STRICTLY PGT-DIRECTED URBAN SHOCK UNITS. BOTH PGT AND FAR/URF REPORTEDLY SHORT OF FUNDS, WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS WHICH MAY HAVE REDUCED THEIR CAPABILITY CARRY OUT LARGE-SCALE COORDINATED ACTS VIOLENCE; HOWEVER, UTILIZING HIT-AND-RUN TACTICS THEY COULD UNCOMFORTABLY INCREASE PRESENT INTENSITY URBAN TERRORISM.

(C) DISSENSION WITHIN LEFT: ISSUES IN CURRENT PGT-FAR DISSENSION ARE TACTICAL RATHER THAN STRATEGIC OR IDEOLOGICAL. BOTH FACTIONS AGREE ON "NEED" FOR ARMED REVOLUTION TO ACHIEVE COMMUNIST POLITICAL VICTORY, DIFFER ONLY AS TO MEANS AND TIMING ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT. OLD-LINE PGT

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LEADERS WISH POSTPONE OR LIMIT VIOLENCE WITH OWN FORCES
REORGANIZED AND PROLETARIAN MASSES INDOCTRINATED IN
COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY. FAR "RED GUARDS" INSIST ON IMMEDIATE
TOTAL VIOLENCE WHICH THEY CLAIM WILL DISRUPT POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE SUFFICIENTLY TO CAUSE BREAKDOWN
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND ASSUMPTION MILITARY DIC-
TATORSHIP; THEY REGARD LATTER CONDITION INDISPENSABLE
STEP TO VICTORY OF REVOLUTION SINCE DICTATORSHIP WOULD
ALIENATE MASSES, DRIVE THEM INTO COMMUNIST-DIRECTED
REBELLION. INSTEAD OF ALL-OUT IMMEDIATE VIOLENCE, PGT
ADVOCATES CONCENTRATION ON TACTICS AND PROPAGANDA DESIGNED
DEMONSTRATE GOG COMPLICITY IN RIGHTIST/MILITARY COUNTER-
TERROR ACTIVITY SO AS TO PROMOTE SUFFICIENT POPULAR FEARS,
DISCONTENT WITH GOG TO CREATE CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO
RIGHT MILITARY COUP. PGT AND FAR THEORIES COINCIDE ON
BOTH STRATEGY AND TACTICS THEY SHOULD ADOPT AFTER MILITARY
DICTATORSHIP INSTALLED. PROGNOSIS AS TO CHARACTER AND
INTENSITY INSURGENT VIOLENCE THEREFORE PRIMARILY DEPENDENT
ON WHICH FACTION--FAR RED GUARDS OR OLD-LINE PGT--DOMINATES
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN NEAR FUTURE. PGT VIEW SEEMS

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DOMINANT AT PRESENT, BUT RED GUARDS MAY DECIDE SPLIT AND
GO IT ALONE. EFFECT ON OVERALL INSURGENCY SHOULD SPLIT
EVENTUATE IMPOSSIBLE TO ANALYZE AT THIS TIME.

3. THREATS FROM RIGHT: (A) CIVILIAN COUNTER-INSURGENCY
GROUPS. IN NORTHEAST REGION, ARMY ADOPTED PRACTICE
ARMING AND ORGANIZING FAIRLY LARGE NUMBERS LOCAL CIVILIANS
INTO COUNTER-GUERRILLA UNITS USED SUCCESSFULLY AGAINST
INSURGENTS. MEMBERS THESE UNITS ARE MILITANT ANTI-
COMMUNISTS, WERE PROBABLY SELECTED AND SCREENED FOR
POLITICAL RELIABILITY BY RIGHTIST LEADERS OF MLN PARTY,
WITH WHOM THEY HAVE CLOSE TIES AND SYMPATHIES AND FROM WHOM
THEY RECEIVE SOME MATERIAL SUPPORT. ARMY STATS ARMED
CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY CONTROL NUMBER APPROXIMATELY 1,800.
THERE ARE ALSO OTHER ARMED GROUPS OPERATING SEMI-INDEPEND-

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THOSE GROUPS THREATEN POLITICAL STABILITY IN

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THREE WAYS: (1) SOME PR LEADERS ALLEGE ARMED GROUPS ARE
INSTRUMENTS OF MLN PLOT TO SYSTEMATICALLY DESTROY PR
PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATION UNDER GUISE ANTI-COMMUNISM. PR
LEADERS FEAR THAT PURPORTED RIGHTIST MILITARY PLANS TO FORM
ADDITIONAL GROUPS THROUGHOUT COUNTRY HAVE PARTISAN-POLITICAL
RATHER THAN COIN MOTIVATION. WHATEVER TRUTH OF ALLEGATION
AY BE, FACT THAT INCREASING NUMBER PR MEMBERS BELIEVE
IT IS A DESTABILIZING FACTOR. (2) ARMED GROUPS ARE POTEN-
TIAL SOURCE OF POWER TO FURTHER POLITICAL AMBITIONS
RIGHTIST POLITICAL OR MILITARY LEADERS.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3344
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S E C R E T FINAL SECTION OF TWO GUATEMALA 1509
13 LONGER GROUPS REMAIN IN BEING GREATER BECOMES ARMY'S
PROBLEM OF MAINTAINING ADEQUATE CONTROL. SO FAR ARMY HAS
KEPT FAIRLY TIGHT REIN, BUT AS INSURGENTS TARGETS THIN OUT,
GROUPS MAY RESIST ARMY ATTEMPTS TO DISBAND THEM, WITH CON-
SEQUENT ADVERSE EFFECT ON STABILITY.

RIGHTIST POLITICIANS.

THE MLN, REALIZING
IT HAS LITTLE ARMY SUPPORT, HAS BEEN RELATIVELY QUIET
THIS REGARD SINCE ITS INVOLVEMENT IN ABORTIVE COUP EFFORTS
IN NOVEMBER, 1966. MLN PUBLICLY SUPPORTS GOG'S COIN CAM-

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PAIGN, HAS CONTINUOUSLY ADOPTED "LOYAL OPPOSITION" POSTURE.

PERENNIAL
PLOTTER ROBERT ALFONSO ARZUMAN IS APPARENTLY BACKING
EFFORTS CREATE POLITICAL CRISIS BY STIMULATING "POPULAR"
DEMAND FOR RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT AND HIS REPLACEMENT
BY VICE PRES MARROQUIN. SOME REPORTS INDICATE CERTAIN IN-
DIVIDUALS FORMERLY CONNECTED WITH THE ARMED GROUPS IN NORTH-

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EAST ALSO INVOLVED WITH ALEJOS. MERE EXISTENCE ARMED GROUPS OF KNOWN RIGHTIST POLITICAL ORIENTATION PROBABLY ACTS AS TEMPTATION AND STIMULUS TO CONSPIRATORS.

4. ARMY'S ROLE: ARMY CONTINUES LOYAL TO GOVT AND FAIRLY UNITED BEHIND MINDEF ARRIAGA. MENDEZ ADMINISTRATION GAVE MILITARY CARTE BLANCHE AND FULL PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR COIN EFFORTS. ARRIAGA HAS SKILLFULLY PLAYED BUFFER ROLE BETWEEN ARMY AND PR, AND HAS ALSO INCREASED HIS PERSONAL CONTROL BY REMOVAL MALCONTENT OFFICERS FROM COMMAND POSITIONS. AS RESULT, SUCCESSOR TO ARRIAGA WOULD BE HARD TO FIND, AND JOCKEYING FOR POSITION MIGHT PRECIPITATE SOME

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5. CONCLUSIONS (A) THERE IS NO REPEAT NO IMMEDIATE DANGER OF OVERTHROW OF GOVERNMENT BY DIRECT ACTION OF LEFT-INSURGENTS. INSURGENT COMBAT INVOLVING ORGANIZED GUERRILLA UNITS IS NOT REPEAT NOT A CURRENT THREAT TO STABILITY IN ANY REGION OF COUNTRY BUT REMAINS A POTENTIAL THREAT PARTICULARLY SHOULD DISSENSION AND RESUPPLY PROBLEMS BE RESOLVED. INSURGENTS DO RETAIN CAPABILITY STAGE SPORADIC HIT-RUN STRIKES OR TERRORIST ACTION IN BOTH URBAN AND RURAL AREAS, AND WILL PROBABLY BE ABLE MAINTAIN SUCH CAPABILITY IN VARYING DEGREE FOR INDEFINITE FUTURE. GOG SECURITY FORCES HAVE ADEQUATE CAPABILITY TO CONTAIN (BUT NOT REPEAT NOT PREVENT) SUCH SPORADIC OUTBREAKS.

MAINS POSITIVE THREAT TO PERSONAL SECURITY AND HENCE FAC- TERRORISM RE-

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TOR OF UNEASE DESPITE FACT THAT CONTINUOUS EXPERIENCE OF VIOLENCE IN PAST YEAR HAS BROADENED PUBLIC'S LEVELS OF TOLERANCE.

FEARS AND DEMANDS FOR PERSONAL SECURITY COALESCE INTO POLITICAL EXPRESSION, STABILITY OF MENDEZ REGIME WOULD BE SERIOUSLY THREATENED. THERE IS ALSO DANGER OF POLARIZATION TOWARD POLITICAL EXTREMES. THIS REPRESENTS MAIN THREAT TO GOVERNMENT IN MAINTAINING POLITICAL STABILITY AT PRESENT TIME. SHOULD PRESENT UNEASE,

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(C) THERE ARE HOWEVER OTHER FACTORS HAVING A BEARING ON
SECURITY SITUATION WHICH MUST BE CONSIDERED IN LARGER

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POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT. THESE FACTORS AND THEIR
POSSIBLE POLICY IMPLICATIONS ARE BEING EXAMINED IN OUR
OVER-ALL REVIEW.

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